The Deficits in Horizontal Accountability in Argentina: A Tale of two worlds

While there are some drawbacks1 in specific countries, democracy has become the ‘only game in town’ in Latin America. The most unequal region of the world has succeeded in guaranteeing democratic rules regionwide. However, several weaknesses remain; among them, how to develop not only good institutions, but also institutional capacities that work respecting the law. This paper looks at the cornerstone of the institutiona weaknesses in the region, namely, the executive-legislative relationship and horizontal accountability (HA). What are the determinants of the low performance of horizontal accountability mechanisms in Latin America and especially in Argentina? In order to address this central question we studied a set of accountability mechanisms using a mix methods approach. The research is organized in two parts: the first explores definitions of horizontal accountability and its mechanisms and determines the extent to which HA mechanisms are useful fit for our case studies. The objective of this first part is to identify whether there is a gap between what is stated in law and what actually takes place, and what the consequences are for non-compliance. The second part aims to understand the determinants that help explain levels of low accountability. So far there has been little research in Latin America that looks specifically at this question. What appears to be the case is that even though the region is making good progress in terms of institutionalizing democratic processes and improving social indicators, there is still much more to do to ensure better horizontal accountability outcomes. Specifically, the executive’s answerability to the Legislative has only slightly improved during the last decade, and this is the case for the whole region. It is also the case that Latin America still lacks good quality data, and this affects not only the decision making process but also the oversight capacity of Congress. In this context, Argentina appears to be an interesting case to conduct an in-depth analysis with a view to increase our understanding of the research question. This case is particularly relevant as Argentina is among the most developed countries in Latin America, but at the same time presents low levels of institutional capacity. Therefore, it may highlight specific factors that have blocked the development of accountability capacities, despite the existence of comparatively higher levels of economic development. The findings from the Argentine case may throw up important lessons for capacity building in other cases as well. Horizontal accountability mechanisms at work in Argentina are relatively new. They were created as a result of the 1994 National Constitution reform. Some of them are meant to be used only in the exceptional case of a crisis (such as the impeachment of the President). But there are also some routine mechanisms that require the Executive to provide information about the government’s plans and actions to the Legislative and for the latter to request answers and to exercise oversight over the Executive. This is the focus of our project.